able quantity. Only a limited number of previous works [29, 34, 35] have investigated the question of how to select a proper value of ǫ, but these approaches either require complicated economic models or lack the analysis of adversaries with arbitrary auxiliary information (see Section 2.3 for more details). Our work is inspired by the interpretation of differential privacy via hypothesis testing, initially introduced by Wasserman and Zhou [27, 30, 60] . However, this interpretation has not been systematically investigated before in the context of our research objective, i.e., reasoning about the choice of the privacy parameter ǫ (see Section 2.4 for more details).
We consider hypothesis testing [2, 45, 61] as the tool used by the adversary to infer sensitive information of an individual record (e.g., the presence or absence of a record in the database for unbounded DP) from the outputs of privacy mechanisms. In particular, we employ the precision-recall (PR) relation from the perspective of hypothesis testing by the adversary as the measurable quantity of interest. The PR relation considers the trade-off between the precision (the fraction of examples classified as input records that are truly existing in the input data for unbounded DP) and the recall (the fraction of truly existing input records that are correctly detected for unbounded DP) from the adversary's perspective.
With this context of hypothesis testing, we consider three research questions in this work: how do we set the value of ǫ, how does auxiliary information affect the choice of ǫ, and can hypothesis testing be used to systematically compare across heterogeneous privacy frameworks? We introduce our concrete approach to address these questions below.
Investigating Differential Privacy. To explore the choice of an appropriate value of ǫ, we consider an adversary who tries to infer the existence of a record d i in the database D from the output of a differentially private mechanism A(D). Our threat model is an adversary who uses hypothesis testing with the NeymanPearson criterion [47] , which is one of the most powerful criteria in hypothesis testing, on the noisy query results obtained by DP mechanisms. We focus on using the Neyman-Pearson criterion for the Laplace perturbation mechanism [17] in order to perform a concrete analysis. We also show how to generalize our approach to other mechanisms such as the Gaussian perturbation mechanism. Particularly, we leverage the PR-relation and the corresponding F βscore (the weighted harmonic average of precision and recall [56] ) as effective metrics to quantify the performance of adversaries' hypothesis testing, which can provide a natural and interpretable guideline for selecting proper privacy parameters by system designers and researchers. Furthermore, we extend our analysis on unbounded DP to bounded DP and the approximate (ǫ, δ)-DP.
Impact of Auxiliary Information. The conjecture that auxiliary information can influence the design of DP mechanisms has been made in prior work [8, 28, 32, 33, 39, 65] . We therefore investigate the adversary's capability based on hypothesis testing under three types of auxiliary information: the prior distribution of the input record, the correlation across records, and the correlation across time. Our analysis demonstrates that the auxiliary information indeed influences the appropriate selection of ǫ. The results suggest that, when possible and available, the practitioners of DP should explicitly incorporate adversary's auxiliary information into the parameter design of their privacy frameworks. Hence, our results provide a rigorous and systematic answer to the important question posted by Dwork and Smith [20] .
Comparison of Statistical Privacy Frameworks. In addition to the two primary questions regarding differential privacy, we also extend our hypothesis testing analysis to a comparative study of a range of state-ofthe-art privacy-preserving frameworks [10, 24, 28, 33, 38, 39] . Some of these frameworks [8, 28, 32, 33, 65] have considered adversaries with auxiliary knowledge in their definitions, but no prior work has applied a common technique to compare and understand their relationship among each other and with differential privacy.
Overall, our work makes the following contributions.
• We investigate differential privacy from the perspective of hypothesis testing by the adversary who observes the differentially private outputs. We comprehensively analyze (i) the unbounded and (ii) bounded scenarios of DP, and (iii) (ǫ, δ)-DP.
• We theoretically derive the PR-relation and the corresponding F βscore as criteria for selecting the value of ǫ that would limit (to the desired extent) the adversary's success in identifying a particular record, in an interpretable and quantitative manner.
• We analyze the effect of three types of auxiliary information, namely, the prior distribution of the input record, the correlation across records, and the correlation across time, on the appropriate choice of ǫ via the hypothesis testing by the adversary.
• Furthermore, we systematically compare the stateof-the-art statistical privacy notions from the perspective of the adversary's hypothesis testing, including Pufferfish privacy [33] , Blowfish privacy [28] , dependent differential privacy [39] , membership privacy [38] , inferential privacy [24] and mutualinformation based differential privacy [10] .
Background and Related Work
In this section, we briefly discuss the frameworks of differential privacy and hypothesis testing, as well as related works regarding these two topics.
Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is a rigorous mathematical framework aimed at protecting the privacy of the user's record in a statistical database [13-15, 17, 20] . The goal of DP is to randomize the query results to ensure that the risk to the user's privacy does not increase substantially (bounded by a function of ǫ) as a result of participating in the statistical database. The notion of ǫ-differential privacy is formally defined as follows. 
and ǫ is the privacy budget.
It is worth noting that the smaller the privacy budget ǫ, the higher the privacy level. This privacy definition is also known as unbounded DP as the database size is unknown. When the database size is known, D and D ′ are neighbors if D can be obtained from D ′ by replacing one record in D ′ with another record. Definition 1 based on this notion of neighbors is known as bounded DP [32] . Approximate DP is another variant of DP, also named (ǫ, δ)-DP [16] , and is defined as
which relaxes DP by ignoring noisy outputs with a certain probability controlled by the parameter δ. In Section 4, we will analyze mechanisms that satisfy these DP guarantees from the adversary's perspective of hypothesis testing.
The Laplace perturbation mechanism (LPM) [17] is a classic and popular mechanism that achieves ǫ-DP, which makes use of the concept of global sensitivity. 
In order to perform a concrete analysis, our work mainly focuses on the Laplace perturbation mechanism. However, our approach also generalizes to other mechanisms such as the Gaussian perturbation mechanism (as discussed in Section 4.3).
In the literature, several statistical privacy frameworks have also been proposed as important generalization of DP, such as Pufferfish privacy [33] , Blowfish privacy [28] , dependent differential privacy [39] , membership privacy [38] , inferential privacy [24] and mutual-information based differential privacy [10] . These privacy frameworks are important statistical privacy frameworks for releasing aggregate information of databases while ensuring provable guarantees, similar to DP. We will systematically compare them with DP from the adversary's perspective of hypothesis testing in Section 6.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis testing [2, 45, 61] is the use of statistics on the observed data to determine the probability that a given hypothesis is true. The common process of hypothesis testing consists of four steps: 1) state the hypotheses; 2) set the criterion for a decision; 3) compute the test statistic; 4) make a decision. The binary hypothesis testing problem 1 decides between a null hypothesis H = h 0 and an alternative hypothesis H = h 1 based on observation of a random variable O [2, 45] . Under hypothesis h 0 , O follows the probability distribution P 0 , while under h 1 , O follows distribution P 1 . A decision ruleĤ is a criterion that maps every possible observation O = o to either h 0 or h 1 .
The most popularly used criteria for decision are maximum likelihood [50] , maximum posterior probability [25] , minimum cost [43] and the Neyman-Pearson criterion [47] . Definition 3. The Neyman-Pearson criterion aims to maximize the true detection rate (the probability of correctly accepting the alternative hypothesis) subject to a maximum false alarm rate (the probability of mistakenly accepting the alternative hypothesis) [47, 61] , i.e.,
where P T D and P F A denote the true detection rate and the false alarm rate, respectively.
The Neyman-Pearson criterion has the highest statistical power [37] since it maximizes the true detection rate under a given requirement of the false alarm rate (as defined above). According to the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [46] , an efficient way to solve Eq. 1 is to implement the likelihood ratio test [49, 57] . In practice, the likelihood ratio, or equivalently its logarithm, can be used directly to construct test statistics to compare the goodness of fit of the two hypotheses. Other criteria such as maximum likelihood [50] , maximum posterior probability [25] and minimum cost [43] 
Setting the Privacy Budget ǫ
Setting the privacy budget ǫ in DP is a challenging task. Prior work [29, [34] [35] [36] attempted to address this problem, but has several limitations. Hsu et al. [29] proposed an economic method to express the balance between the accuracy of a DP release and the strength of privacy guarantee in terms of a cost function when bad events happen. However, this work involves complicated economic models consisting of bad events and their corresponding cost functions. It is difficult to quantify the cost of a bad event for general applications. Krehbiel [34] takes each data owner's privacy preference into consideration and aims to select a proper privacy parameter for achieving a good tradeoff between utility and privacy. This mechanism focuses more on an economic perspective for collecting and distributing payments under a chosen level of privacy parameter and their privacy definition is not the standard DP.
Other related works by Lee and Clifton [35, 36] determine ǫ for LPM based on the posterior probability that the adversary can infer the value of a record. The Neyman-Pearson criterion adopted in our approach has an advantage over the maximum posterior probability analysis [25] . As stated in Section 2.2, the NeymanPearson criterion in our work can be used to optimize a range of evaluation metrics by selecting a proper value of the false alarm rate while maximizing the true detection rate. In addition, their analysis [35] only assumes uniform distribution of the input data (equivalent to the scenarios without any prior distribution) in both their experiments and theoretical derivations.
Finally, these previous works are noticeably different from our approach as they do not utilize the statistical tool of hypothesis testing (especially the NeymanPearson criterion) by the adversary. Furthermore, our work is not limited to the selection of the ǫ value, but is also extended to the analysis on the impact of the auxiliary information possessed by the adversary and the comparison across the state-of-the-art statistical privacy frameworks, which has not been studied before.
Hypothesis Testing in DP
Previous work in [21, 48, 58] has investigated how to accurately compute the test statistics in hypothesis testing while using DP to protect data. Ding et al. designed an algorithm to detect privacy violations of DP mechanisms from a hypothesis testing perspective [12] . Wasserman and Zhou [60], Hall et al. [27] , and Kairouz et al. [30] are our inspiration for using hypothesis testing on DP. These works propose a view of DP from the perspective of hypothesis testing by the adversary who observes the differentially private outputs. Specifically, the observation is first made by Wasserman and Zhou [60] for bounding the probability for the adversary to correctly reject a false hypothesis of the input database. Hall et al. [27] later extend such analysis to (ǫ, δ)-DP. Kairouz et al. [30] then apply this concept in their proof of composition of DP. However, these prior works have not applied hypothesis testing to our objectives of determining the appropriate value of ǫ.
In contrast, our work extensively analyzes the adversary's capability of implementing hypothesis testing using Neyman-Pearson's criterion [47] on outputs of DP mechanisms, such as LPM and the Gaussian perturbation mechanism. We apply it to the problem of determining ǫ, the analysis of the effect of auxiliary information on the choice of ǫ, and the comparative analysis From Eq. 3, we know that precision is the probability that hypothesis h 1 , which the adversary's hypothesis testing says is true, is indeed true; and recall is the probability that hypothesis h 1 , which is indeed true, is detected as true by the adversary's hypothesis testing. Note that the randomness in the process of computing precision and recall comes from the statistical noise added in DP mechanisms. Therefore, our analysis aims to quantify the capability of the adversary that leverages the hypothesis testing technique in identifying any specific record from DP outputs.
PR-relation quantifies the actual detection accuracy of the adversary, which has a one-to-one correspondence with the false alarm rate P F A and the missed detection rate 1 − P T D [30] . Different from Kairouz et al. [30] that quantifies the relative relationship between P F A and 1 − P T D , we obtain explicit expression of the precision and recall of the adversary that exploits the NeymanPearson criterion (in Sections 4.1.3, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3). It is also interesting to note that there exists a one-toone correspondence between PR-relation and the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) [11] . Therefore, our analysis in the domain of PR-relation can be directly transferred to the domain of ROC.
Furthermore, we theoretically prove that the adversary that implements Neyman-Pearson criterion achieves the optimal PR-relation (in Theorem 2) and this optimality is generally applicable for correlated records (in Corollary 1). The corresponding proofs are deferred to the appendix.
Theorem 2. The Neyman-Pearson criterion characterizes the optimal adversary that can achieve the best PR-relation.

Corollary 1. The optimality of Neyman-Pearson criterion given in Theorem 2 holds for correlated records in the database.
In addition, we leverage F βscore (weighted harmonic average of precision and recall), to further quantify the relationship between the adversary's hypothesis testing and the privacy parameter ǫ, which also provides an interpretable guideline to practitioners and researchers for selecting ǫ.
(for any real number β > 0) is an example for quantifying the PR-relation in order to understand the adversary's power in a more convenient manner, since it combines the two metrics, precision and recall, into a single metric. However, this combination has the potential of information loss of the PR-relation which broadly covers the adversary's hypothesis testing in the entire space (more discussions in Section 4.1.4). Note that every step of our analysis in Figure 1 is accurate in quantifying the adversary's hypothesis testing under the Neyman-Pearson criterion using the metrics of PR-relation and F βscore .
Generalizing to Other Privacy Mechanisms and Practical Adversaries:
We further generalize our analysis of the conventional ǫ-DP to its variants such as (ǫ, δ)-DP (adopting the Gaussian perturbation mechanism), more advanced privacy notions, and also adversaries with auxiliary information. Our analysis shows that the adversary's auxiliary information in the form of prior distribution of the input database, the correlation across records and time can affect the relationship between the two posterior probabilities (corresponding to the two hypotheses made by the adversary), thus impacting the proper value of privacy parameter ǫ.
Quantification of DP from the Adversary's Hypothesis Testing
In this section, we theoretically analyze the capability of the adversary's hypothesis testing for inferring sensitive information of a particular record from DP outputs. Specifically, we implement our analysis on the unbounded and bounded scenarios of DP and (ǫ, δ)-DP.
Quantification of Unbounded DP
Hypothesis Testing Problem
Recall that the Neyman-Pearson criterion [47] aims to maximize the true detection rate of the hypothesis test given a constrained false alarm rate (Definition 3). Following our threat model and methodology in Section 3, the adversary would assume the following two hypotheses, corresponding to the presence or the absence of a record d i :
This is clearly the unbounded DP setting (we will analyze the bounded DP setting and other DP variations in the next subsections.). After observing the noisy query result A(D) = o, the adversary tries to distinguish the two events D = D and D = D ′ by analyzing the corresponding posterior probabilities of
we know that distinguishing the two posterior probabilities is equivalent to differentiating the two conditional probabilities of P (A(D) = o) and P (A(D ′ ) = o), 2 for adversaries that have no access to the prior distribution of the input database and thus assume a uniform prior, i.e.,
Decision Rule
Adversary's Hypothesis Testing for Scalar Query: We first consider the situation where the query output is a scalar and then generalize our analysis to vector output. It is worth noting that DP is defined in terms of probability measures but likelihood is defined in terms of probability densities. However, we use them interchangeably in this paper (we can change the probability densities to the probability measures through quantizing over the query output for instance). Without loss of generality, we assume Q(D) ≥ Q(D ′ ). Then, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Applying Neyman-Pearson criterion of maximizing the true detection rate under a given requirement of false alarm rate α in Definition 3 is equivalent to the following hypothesis testing which is of a simpler formulation: setting a threshold
for the output of LPM-based DP mechanisms A(D) = o, then the decision rule of the adversary's hypothesis
Proof. Following the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [46] , we utilize the likelihood ratio test [49, 57] to realize the Neyman-Pearson criterion. Therefore, we first compute the likelihood ratio Λ(o) of the two hypotheses and set a threshold λ on this ratio for the adversary's decision.
represents the same conditional probability as
Under a given requirement of the false alarm rate α, we can uniquely determine the threshold θ of the noisy output. Then, we can compute λ from θ. Next, let us discuss each step of this proof in detail.
Construct Likelihood Ratio Test: Given the noisy scalar output
) from the LPM, we can compute the likelihood ratio Λ(o) corresponding to the two hypotheses defined in Eq. 4 as
Assume the decision threshold for the likelihood ratio is λ, then the corresponding decision rule in Neyman-
Uniquely Determine θ from α: Under a threshold θ on the noisy output o, P F A can be computed as
. Therefore, for a given requirement of the false alarm rate α, we can obtain Eq. 6.
Compute λ from θ: Based on Eq. 7, we know that
Then, the decision rule becomes e
. 4 Therefore, the threshold λ for the likelihood ratio Λ(o) can be computed from the threshold θ for the noisy output o as
Based on the analysis above, we know that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the false alarm rate α and the threshold of the noisy output θ. This uniquely determined θ satisfies the existence and sufficient conditions for achieving Neyman-Pearson Lemma (see Theorem 3.2.1 in [37] ). Therefore, the NeymanPearson criterion in our setting is equivalent to making a decision rule of o 
Choosing Proper ǫ
The privacy parameter ǫ can relatively measure the privacy guarantees of DP mechanisms. However, choosing appropriate values for ǫ is non-trivial since its impact on the privacy risks of the input data in practice are not well understood. Our method of choosing ǫ considers the capability of the adversary's hypothesis testing to identify any particular record as being in the database. Specifically, we provide guidelines for selecting proper values of ǫ using PR-relation and F βscore , respectively. Guidelines under PR-relation: Our analysis by leveraging PR-relation generally covers the adversary's trade-offs between precision and recall in the entire space. Figure 3 (a) demonstrates that, with sufficiently low privacy budget ǫ, an adversary's ability to identify an individual record in the database is indeed limited. Under a given requirement of trade-offs between precision and recall of the adversary's hypothesis testing, the privacy mechanism designer can refer to the PR-relation obtained in Eqs. 9, 10, 11 and Figure 3 (a) to choose an appropriate privacy budget ǫ. Guidelines under F βscore : Besides the PR-relation, we also leverage the F βscore , which is a weighted harmonic average of precision and recall, as another appropriate metric for quantifying the effectiveness of the adversary's hypothesis testing. Furthermore, we can theoretically derive the highest F βscore (by selecting a proper threshold θ) that the adversary can achieve for arbitrary real number β > 0 as
and the detailed proof is deferred to the Appendix. Next, we show F * βscore with varying privacy parameter ǫ in Figure 3 ure 3(b) are accurate quantification of the adversary's hypothesis testing from the perspective of F βscore , from which we observe that the adversary's capability of inferring the existence of an individual record is generally enhanced with an increasing value of ǫ. F βscore can be interpreted as a summary statistic for the PR-relation, which provides a more convenient way of quantifying the relationship between the adversary' hypothesis testing and the privacy parameter ǫ. Under a desired bound of F * βscore that the adversary's hypothesis testing can achieve, the privacy mechanism practitioners can refer to Eq. 12 and Figure 3(b) to choose an appropriate value of ǫ. Furthermore, we provide numerical bounds of ǫ under different requirements of F βscore for commonly-used weights of β ∈ [0.5, 2] in Table 1 , as an easier way to look up for privacy practitioners.
When the summary statistics of the precision and recall are used (as opposed to using the full PR-relation information), such as the use of the F βscore , there is potential for information loss, especially in the regime corresponding to smaller values of ǫ (Eq. 12 and Figure 3(b) ). It is interesting to note that F * βscore keeps the same for ǫ < log(1 + β 2 ), and then monotonically increases with ǫ for ǫ ≥ log(1 + β 2 ). This turning point ǫ = log(1+β 2 ) approaches 0 for smaller values of β, making F * βscore closer to be monotonically increasing with ǫ thus capturing the privacy benefits of smaller values of ǫ (as shown Figure 3(b) ).
Finally, we emphasize that the alternative approach of using the entire PR-relation to guide the selection of ǫ does not suffer from the limitations discussed above, and also shows privacy benefits of using smaller ǫ (smaller precision for a given recall as shown in Figure 3(a) ).
Plausible Deniability Property
There are multiple ways to interpret semantics of DP guarantees such as hypothesis testing [27, 30, 60] and plausible deniability (Page 9 in Dwork [13] , Page 2 in Dwork and Smith [20] , Definition 1 in Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith [17] , Section 2 in Kasiviswanathan and Smith [31] , Section 4 in Li et al. [38] ). The potential of randomness providing plausible deniability was first recognized by Warner [59] . Bindschaedler et al. provide a formal definition of plausible deniability for data synthesis, compared to which DP is a stronger privacy guarantee [5] .
Definition 4. (Plausible Deniability
We interpret DP as hypothesis testing -how well an adversary in DP can infer the existence of an individual record (unbounded DP) or the exact value of a record (bounded DP) in binary hypothesis testing problem involving two neighboring databases (Dwork [13] , Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith [17] , Kifer and Machanavajjhala [32] ). Theorem 3 demonstrates that the adversary implements the likelihood ratio test
to satisfy the Neyman-Pearson criterion and the decision rule in Eq. 6 is equivalent to
λ. Combining Eq. 6 and Eq. 8, we know that . According to Definition 4, the plausible deniability also quantifies the likelihood ratio between two data (although it only considers the scenario of privacy-preserving data synthesis [5] ). Therefore, our analysis of using hypothesis testing to guide selection of proper privacy parameters in DP has implicitly incorporated the plausible deniability of any individual records in the database (controlled by the maximum false alarm rate α in the Neyman-Person criterion). Furthermore, α determines a trade-off between the false alarm rate P F A and the true detection rate P T D (Definition 3). Therefore, our analysis of using PR-relation (which has a one-to-one correspondence with P F A , P T D ) and F βscore (summary statistics of precision and recall) generated by varying α quantifies the randomness and the plausible deniability [59] [5] of any individual records in the database.
Quantification of Bounded DP
Bounded DP corresponds to the setting where the neighboring databases differ in one (record's) value and their size is the same. For simplicity, we first discuss a scenario where the i-th record of the input data d i can only take binary values d i1 , d i2 . Note that the hypothesis testing by the adversary in the bounded scenario is different from the unbounded scenario in that the adversary is no longer aiming to distinguish the absence/presence of a record, but to estimate the true value of a record. Thus, the adversary's hypothesis testing now becomes:
Comparing Eq. 4 and Eq. 13, we know that the two hypotheses for unbounded and bounded cases are different. However, according to Theorem 5, their corresponding P R-relation (and F βscore ) are the same. This means, the hypothesis testing implemented by the adversary for bounded DP with binary records is the same as that for unbounded DP. Next, we consider a more general scenario where
Therefore, the distance between any two query results computed over two different values of d i is smaller than the sensitivity of the query ∆Q = max Q(d ik )−Q(d i1 ) .
Since the inserted noise for satisfying DP is calculated based on ∆Q (i.e., Lap( ∆Q ǫ )), we know that the hypothesis testing achieved by the adversary in distinguishing any two values of d i is not worse than distinguishing d i1 and d ik . We thus conclude that the best hypothesis testing of the adversary for the bounded scenario is the same as that for the unbounded scenario.
Quantification of (ǫ, δ)-DP
Approximate DP, also named (ǫ, δ)-DP [16] is defined as P (A(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ǫ)P (A(D ′ ) ∈ S) + δ for any neighboring databases D, D ′ . One of the most popular mechanisms to achieve (ǫ, δ)-DP is the Gaussian perturbation mechanism, where a Gaussian noise with zero mean and standard variant σ = 2 log(1.25/δ)∆Q/ǫ is added to the query output [16, 18] .
Similar to Section 4.1, we first derive the mechanism for the adversary's hypothesis testing that satisfies the Neyman-Pearson criterion based on the following theorem (detailed proof is deferred to the Appendix). 
Theorem 6. Applying Neyman-Pearson criterion in Definition 3 is equivalent to the following hypothesis testing which is of a simpler formulation: setting a threshold
θ = Φ −1 (1 − α)σ + Q(D ′ ) (
imum P F A and Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution) for the output of the Gaussian perturbation mechanism o, the decision for the adversary's hypothesis testing is
According to Theorem 6 and Eq. 11, we can theoretically derive precision and recall of the adversary's hypothesis testing for the Gaussian mechanism as
We further show the corresponding PR-relation of the adversary's hypothesis testing in Figure 4 (a) and Figure 4(b) with varying ǫ and δ, respectively. We observe that the adversary's performance of hypothesis testing is enhanced with an increasing value of ǫ and δ. Comparing Figure 3 (a) and Figure 4 , we know that different mechanisms vary in their power of defending against adversaries' hypothesis testing since their output distributions are different. Note that our approach can be generally applied to any DP mechanism (Figure 1 ), although we focus on LPM and GPM. Next, the highest F βscore of the adversary's hypothesis testing under different values of privacy parameters ǫ, δ can be directly derived from Eq. 14 as
Balle and Wang [4] developed the analytic Gaussian mechanism whose variance is calibrated using the Gaussian cumulative density function instead of a tail bound approximation. Other recent works also proposed tight lower bounds for the variance of the added Gaussian noise while satisfying (ǫ, δ)-DP [23, 51] . How to adapt our analysis for the classical Gaussian mechanism in Theorem 6 and Eqs. 14, 15 to these improved Gaussian mechanisms [4, 23, 51] is an interesting future direction.
Quantification of DP under Auxiliary Information from the Adversary's Hypothesis Testing
We now demonstrate how to control the adversary's success rate in identifying of a particular record with several important variations of the adversary's belief including the input data's prior distribution, record correlation and temporal correlation.
Quantification of DP under Prior Distribution
Let us first consider an adversary with known prior distribution of the input data. Although such an adversary is not explicitly considered in conventional DP frameworks 5 , we still analyze this adversary's inference for sensitive information in a particular record as an interesting and practical case study. In some scenarios, the adversary's prior is non-uniform, which will result in a different decision rule. Similar to our analysis in Section 4.2, we still consider a binary hypothesis testing problem where the adversary aims to distinguish the two neighboring databases in Eq. 13. Next, we quantify the hypothesis testing of the adversary to distinguish the two posterior distributions of
. Then, we get
Based on Eq. 16, we know that the adversary's hypothesis testing under prior distribution is equivalent to distinguishing the two probabilities of 
, where ρ p ∈ [0, 1]. ρ p = 0 corresponds to the scenario where the adversary has no knowledge about the prior distribution and thus makes the assumption of uniform distribution (the same as in Section 4.1). Combining Eq. 11 with Eq. 16, we can de-5 DP guarantees are not influenced by the prior distribution of the input data. recall for this adversary's hypothesis testing as
Eq. 23 holds since max (1−ρc) ) . From Eq. 23, we know that precision is increased under the same level of recall when the adversary has access to the temporal correlation of the input data, resulting in a better P R-relation compared to the static scenario. We show the enhanced PR-relation in Figure 7 (b) by setting ρ p = 0.2, ρ c = 0.1, ρ t = 0.1 for example. Furthermore, we theoretically compute the highest F βscore under given values of privacy budget ǫ, coefficient of prior distribution ρ p , coefficient of record correlation ρ c and coefficient of temporal correlation ρ t as
where ǫ(ρ p , ρ c , ρ t ) = log(1 + β 2 1−ρp−(2−ρp)(ρc+ρt(1−ρc)) ) and the corresponding proof is deferred to the Appendix. From Eq. 24, we know that the temporal correlation can benefit the adversary's hypothesis testing to achieve an enhanced F * βscore . Therefore, the correlation of the input data across time should be considered in selecting appropriate privacy parameters of privacy preserving mechanisms. Summary for the Quantification of DP under Auxiliary Information: Figure 8 shows the highest F βscore (setting β = 1) varying with ǫ under different auxiliary information. We can observe that the adversary can infer more information of the input data with more auxiliary information (higher values of ρ p , ρ c , ρ t ). This property can also be explained by using conditioning always reduces entropy (uncertainty) in information theory [9] . Therefore, choosing a proper privacy budget ǫ needs more careful consideration when designing privacy-preserving mechanisms against adversaries who have access to these auxiliary information.
Relating PR-relation to DP Guarantees
Since the computation of PR-relation involves a specific adversary model, the connection between the PRrelation and privacy guarantees (DP) depend on what assumptions we make for the adversaries.
Optimal Adversary: considering an optimal adversary that implements the Neyman-Pearson criterion and with full access to the possible auxiliary information of the data, under a specific mechanism, the PRrelation achieved by the adversary would be fixed (since every step of our analysis in Figure 1 is exact) as shown in Eqs. 9, 10, 11 for Laplacian mechanism, Eq. 14 for Gaussian mechanism, and Eqs. 17, 20, 23 under auxiliary information. For a given PR-relation that follows this fixed pattern (named as P R optimal ), we thus can infer the values of privacy parameters in DP guarantees by computing them directly from the corresponding equations (Eqs. 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20, 23) of PR-relation or the corresponding Figures 3(a) , 4, 5(b), 6(b), 7(b).
Realistic Adversary: considering a realistic adversary that may not have access to the full auxiliary information, the PR-relation (named as P R realistic ) may be different. Nevertheless, we can still obtain a lower bound for the corresponding privacy parameters, by finding a lower bound of P R realistic , denoted as P R optimalLow , within all possible P R optimal relations (corresponding to different privacy parameters). Since the best PR-relation achieved by the optimal adversary under this mechanism should be better than P R realistic , we know that the values of privacy parameters corresponding to the given P R realistic should be larger than the privacy parameters corresponding to the lowerbound optimal PR-relation P R optimalLow .
Quantification of Other Privacy
Notions from the Adversary's Hypothesis Testing
In this section, we systematically compare several existing statistical privacy frameworks from the perspective PR-relation that can be achieved by the adversary. A privacy notion with a smaller ǫ in Theorem 7 is weaker in restricting an adversary's capability of performing hypothesis testing to infer an individual record. Combining the qualitative analysis in Section 6.1 and the quantitative comparison shown in Theorem 7, we know that under the same level of PR-relation, a larger value of ǫ can be selected for a privacy notion with less restrictions in the definition of neighboring databases. Based on Theorem 7, we further compare these privacy notions under two special data distributions: 1) independent records and 2) independent and uniform records, as shown in the following propositions.
Proposition 1. Privacy Comparison under Independent Records: If the individual records in the database are independent of each other, we have
ǫ BP (ht) = ǫ DDP (ht) = ǫ IP (ht) = ǫ DP (ht) ǫ DDP (ht) ≤ 2ǫ M P (ht) ǫ M IDP (ht) ≤ ǫ M P (ht)
Proposition 2. Privacy Comparison under Independent and Uniform Records: If the individual records in the database are independent of each other, and each record is uniformly distributed, we have
Discussions, Limitations and Future Works
Differential privacy provides a stability condition to the perturbation mechanism towards changes to the input, and there are ways to interpret its semantic privacy guarantee, such as hypothesis testing [27, 30, 60 ] and plausible deniability [59] [5]. In our work, we focus on leveraging hypothesis testing to provide a privacy interpretation for DP mechanisms, which has implicitly taken the plausible deniability of any individual records in the database into consideration (recall Section 3). Our analysis focuses on the popular LPM-based DP mechanisms, based on which we illustrate how hypothesis testing can be used for the selection of privacy parameters. We have shown the generality of our approach by applying it to the Gaussian perturbation mechanism in Section 4.3. Investigating how to generalize our analysis to a broader range of privacy mechanisms and metrics such as the exponential mechanism, randomized response, local DP and geo-indistinguishability [3] could be interesting future directions.
In our work, we consider the adversary who aims to infer the presence/absence of any particular record (for unbounded DP) or the true value of a record (for bounded DP), which is the standard adversary considered in DP framework. In practice, the adversary may be more interested in some aggregate statistics of the record, for instance, whether the value of the record d i is higher than a given value γ. Under this scenario, the two hypotheses of the adversary can be constructed as h 0 : d i > γ, h 1 : d i ≤ γ and then similar analysis in Sections 4, 5 can be conducted for implementing hypothesis testing. We will study the hypothesis testing of these adversaries in the future.
Our analysis considers adversaries with accurate auxiliary information of the prior distribution and correlation across records/time of the input database. In practice, it can be challenging for defenders to have an accurate estimate of the adversary's auxiliary information. Therefore, investigating the capability of adversary's hypothesis testing with approximate auxiliary information could be another interesting future work.
Motivated by composition properties of DP [22, 30, 41] , it is interesting to investigate the composability of our analysis across different privacy mechanisms and explore tighter composition properties under specific mechanisms similar to [30] in the future.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the state-of-the-art statistical privacy frameworks (focusing on DP) from the perspective of hypothesis testing of the adversary. We rigorously analyze the capability of an adversary for inferring a particular record of the input data using hypothesis testing. Our analysis provides a useful and interpretable guideline for how to select the privacy parameter ǫ in DP, which is an important question for practitioners and researchers in the community. Our findings show that an adversary's auxiliary information -in the form of prior distribution of the database, and correlation across records and time -indeed influences the proper choice of ǫ. Finally, our work systematically compares several state-of-the-art privacy notions from the perspective of adversary's hypothesis testing and showcases their relationship with each other and with DP.
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Appendix
Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. Achieve the minimal P F A under a given level of P T D : For a given false alarm rate P F A , the maximal true detection rate P T D can be achieved according to the Neyman-Pearson criterion (Definition 3). Furthermore, note that the maximal P T D is not decreasing with the increasing of P F A . Thus, under a given level of the true detection rate
, the adversary implementing the Neyman-Pearson criterion can achieve the minimal false alarm rate
As a direct result of this, we obtain a minimal
Achieve the maximal precision under a given level of recall: Since both P T D and recall correspond to P (D = D|D = D), we know that a given level of recall is equivalent to the same level of P T D . Therefore, under a given level of recall (i.e., P T D ), the precision can be computed as
Therefore, the Neyman-Pearson criterion can achieve the maximal precision under any given level of recall, thus characterizing the optimal adversary that can achieve the best PR-relation.
Proof for Corollary 1
Proof. This optimality is generally applicable for adversaries implementing the Neyman-Pearson criterion, under any distribution of the input data. This is because the proof in Theorem 2 demonstrates the inherent relationship among these quantification metrics (i.e., the maximization of P T D under a given level of P F A is equivalent to maximizing precision under a given level of recall), regardless of the distribution of the data. Therefore, the optimality of Neyman-Pearson criterion (maximizing P T D under a given level of P F A ) to achieve the best PR-relation holds for correlated records. where the correlation relationships are naturally incorporated in the likelihood ratio detection process of the NeymanPearson criterion.
F * βscore for Unbounded DP
According to the definition of F βscore , we know that maximizing F βscore is equivalent to minimizing
. Then, we define f = . Then, we take the derivative of f with respect to θ as
Therefore, we have
> 0, i.e., the function f increases monotonically with θ ∈ (−∞, Q(D ′ )], if ǫ < log(1 + β 2 ). Otherwise, it decreases monotonically. 2) For the second interval of (Q(D ′ ), Q(D)), we have
. We then compute the derivative of f with respect to θ as
> 0. i.e., the function f increases mono-
. Otherwise, it decreases and then increases thus there is a mininum within this interval. To solve for this mininum, we set the derivative to 0, i.e., e −ǫ − e
The corresponding minimum value for F βscore can be computed as
0.5e
. We then take the derivative of f with respect to θ as
Therefore, we know that f increases monotonically with θ ∈ [Q(D), +∞). Combining all the three intervals 1)-3), we obtain the highest F βscore as in Eq. 12.
Proof for Theorem 6
Proof. According to the Neyman-Pearson Lemma [46] , the likelihood ratio test [49, 57] can be utilized to achieve the Neyman-Pearson criterion. For an adversary with access to the noisy scalar output o = A(D) = Q(D)+N (2 log(1.25/δ)∆Q/ǫ), we can compute the likelihood ratio corresponding to the two hypotheses defined in Eq. 4 as
Then, we can compute the false alarm rate α according to 1 −
, where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution probability (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. Then, the threshold λ for the likelihood ratio can be computed as exp
and the true detection rate can be computed according to
For a given false alarm rate α, we can uniquely determine the threshold of the likelihood ratio λ, the threshold of the output θ and the true detection rate P T D . Since θ can be any possible value of the private query result, we know that the Neyman-Pearson criterion is equivalent to setting a threshold θ for the Gaussian mechanism which is of a simpler formulation. Consider an adversary with access to the prior distribution of the input database. Since
F
, we know that maximizing F βscore is equivalent to minimizing
RSR
. Next, we define f = . Next, we take the derivative of f as
Therefore, we have 
Therefore, f increases monotonically for θ ∈ (−∞, Q(D ′ )]. Combining the analysis for all the three intervals, we can achieve F * βscore as in Eq. 12.
F * βscore under Record Correlation
The computation of the highest F βscore for adversaries under record correlation is similar to that of adversaries with prior distribution. By comparing Eq. 17 and Eq. 20, we can also simply replace ρ p in Eq. 18 with ρ p + ρ c (2 − ρ p ) to obtain Eq. 21.
F * βscore under Temporal Correlation
The computation of the highest F βscore for adversaries under temporal correlation is similar to that of adversaries with prior distribution and record correlation. By comparing Eq. 17 with Eq. 23, we can also simply replace ρ p in Eq. 18 with ρ p + (2 − ρ p )(ρ c + ρ t (1 − ρ c )) to obtain Eq. 24.
Proof for Theorem 7
Proof. The Blowfish framework [28] , which is a subclass of the Pufferfish framework, allows user to specify adversarial knowledge about the database in the form of deterministic policy constraints. In the presence of general deterministic constraints, pairs of neighboring databases can differ in any number of tuples. The neighboring databases of dependent differential privacy differ in L tuples caused by one direct modification of one tuple. Therefore, under the same performance achieved by the adversary's hypothesis testing (the same amount of perturbation), we know that ǫ DDP (ht) ≤ ǫ BP (ht). Since the neighboring databases in DP only differ in one tuple, we know that ǫ DP (ht) ≤ ǫ DDP (ht) under the same hypothesis testing achieved by the adversary.
Next, we consider membership privacy whose mathematical form is different from other privacy metrics. Membership privacy does not consider two neighboring databases, but only bounds the ratio between the posterior probability and the prior probability for any data record. Based on the definition of membership privacy and inferential privacy, we know that the membership privacy satisfying exp(−ǫ) ≤ P (D=D|A(D)=o) P (D=D) ≤ exp(ǫ) would lead to max di1,di2
P (Di=di2) in inferential privacy (and thus dependent differential privacy). That is to say, ǫ-membership privacy would lead to 2ǫ-dependent differential privacy. Therefore, we have ǫ DDP (ht) ≤ 2ǫ M P (ht) under the same performance of the adversary's hypothesis testing.
Furthermore, membership privacy considers the worst-case difference between posterior probability and prior probability, and the mutual information based differential privacy considers the average difference between posterior probability and prior probability. Therefore, we have that ǫ-membership privacy would lead to ǫ-mutual information based differential privacy. Under the same performance of the adversary's hypothesis testing, we have ǫ M IDP (ht) ≤ ǫ M P (ht).
